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analysis of the historic first case before the Iraqi High Tribunal. The speak-
ers' remarks have been edited for length.
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Michael P. Scharf, Professor and Director, Frederick K. Cox International
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Nehal Bhuta, Arthur Helton Fellow, Human Rights Watch
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Mark Drumbl, Professor and Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow Director, Trans-
national Law Institute, Washington & Lee University School of Law
Mark Ellis, Executive Director, International Bar Association
Sandy Hodgkinson, Deputy, Office of War Crimes Issues, U.S. State De-
partment
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WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, DIRECTOR, IRISH CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND, GALWAY
MARIEKE WIERDA, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
TRANSCRIPT:
PROF. SCHARF: The issue is: should a foreign judge have been added
to the Iraq High Tribunal bench? As you all in the audience
know, the statute of the Iraq High Tribunal, which you have in
your books, says that a foreign judge or judges can be added.
And many people today have suggested that that would have
been a solution to many of the problems. I leave it to our ex-
perts today to comment. Professor Crane?
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PROF. CRANE: Yes, absolutely. It would have assisted unfortunately
in the burden of legitimacy. I think it would have assisted in
washing away some of the real challenges and legitimacy, that
if you had a distinguished international jurist or two, I think it
would have helped greatly.
PROF. BASsIOuNI: No, absolutely. Just to be a little controversial,...
my answer would be: if I were in Iraq, I would say you have
tampered enough with our legal system. Let us run our tribu-
nal. This is our business. These are our crimes and quit med-
dling with our laws and our legal systems and our procedures.
PROF. SCHARF: Mark Drumbl?
PROF. DRUMBL: International lawyers reflexively consider interna-
tional judges to be neutral, credible, and legitimate. Popula-
tions on the ground, including victim populations, do not in-
variably feel the same way. Disconnects especially arise when
local populations feel justice is being meted out to them in-
stead of for them.
One of the problems with the ICTY and the ICTR is
that these international institutions are not perceived on the
ground as neutral. After all, the member-states from which
many judges are nationals are not viewed as being neutral.
These states failed to prevent the conflict that actually oc-
curred in those two jurisdictions. Internationalization is no
proxy for legitimacy.
Similarly, I would say that, for Iraqis, just because
something is internationalized does not mean it is ipso facto
more legitimate. There is much to be said for institutions un-
der local control proceeding through local methodologies of
accountability. There is also much to be said in terms of skep-
ticism towards national institutions, as well. In the end, I think
we need to be mindful of the ambiguities.
MR. ELLIS: No, as well.., but for the reason that international law is
moving in the direction of requiring states to undertake these
trials. We need to accent this new reality, and we need to pro-
vide assistance to act for domestic trials stated they meet in-
ternational standards. That's where we failed here.
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Ms. HODGK1NSON: And I would add a qualifying no in the sense that
it obviously is an Iraqi decision, and they put that provision in
there [to leave open] the possibility, wondering if there would
be qualified candidates who would offer themselves up for the
challenge.
One of the challenges you do face when you start ac-
cepting international judges includes issues like translation. If
there were not an Arab-speaking judge, understanding the tra-
dition, throwing one judge into a panel, for example, may ac-
tually pose some of those challenges they are facing in Cam-
bodia right now [because] the mixed tribunal judges do not
speak a common language. But obviously, it is an Iraqi deci-
sion. They chose to use international advisors, and interna-
tional advisors have played that role in trying to build the le-
gitimacy, and they should have more of them.
PROF. SCHARF: David, do you want to try to rehabilitate your posi-
tion?
PROF. CRANE: Well, I actually do not really disagree with what we are
saying. I mean, certainly, at the end of the day, it is for and
about the victims and the country, and so having been through
that in Sierra Leone, I implicitly agree with that. But again,
the tragedy . . . is not that it is not working ... it is just that
there is this little word called legitimacy . . . The question
was, "Could it have?" And the answer is, "Yes, it may have."
And I am not backing off on yes. It is just that certainly all
these points are correct, and I guess you want to get this thing
going.
PROF. BASSIOUNI: You are talking like a lawyer now. It occurred to
me there was a nice biblical story about how if you could find
one righteous man, you would save David, and you would
save Sodom and Gomorrah, and my question is: how many
righteous judges in the various international tribunals that you
know would you set up to the high standards that you want to
offer to the Iraqi tribunal?
2006-2007]
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PROF. CRANE: Oh, see, that is not fair, Cherif. You know my feeling.
• . we were chatting about this over dinner last night. The
Achilles' heal of any tribunal-whether it is an international-
ized domestic court or a hybrid international war crimes tribu-
nal or an ad hoc war crimes tribunal-let us be honest, it is the
judges.
We have judges who are distinguished, very experi-
enced all the way down to people who need help getting to the
men's room and everything in between.
PROF. CRANE: And we had very much a problem where I was in West
Africa... we have to standardize how we train and how we
deal with international judges. So you are right. I mean, I said
yes, but where we would find [such a judge] other than your-
self. How do you like that for a plug?
PROF. BASSIOUNI: I like that.
PROF. DRUMBL: Talk about lawyer language.
PROF. SCHABAS: I just want to back up David, because David's point
was that there is a problem of legitimacy with the judges, and
I think that is a valid point. And the idea of international
judges, of course, at the consent of Iraq because it is an Iraqi
tribunal might have done something to resolve that.
I feel people like yourself Mike [Scharf] and Mike
Newton and others who have done training with the judges,
you describe your evolution and how you got more and more
confident about them as you got to know them. And I am sure
that that is true. I am sure among the judges, there are very
devoted jurists who want to be fair and reasonable. My con-
cern is not with the ones who were left on the bench; it is the
ones who are gone. And I think that is the point Mark Ellis
made this morning The debate, frankly, fudged it, and people
talking about the fairness of the trial have not tackled that one
head-on. You look at this trial head-on, the part of it that
smells the most is the fact you have had three judges leave for
very mysterious reasons, and we could not even get clarity on
this most recent case, and that is shocking. This is supposed to
be the brains trust of the Iraqi justice system. We cannot even
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agree on why that judge lost the job. When did you last have a
trial in the United States where three judges departed in the
course of a trial? That is what is so terrible about it, and that is
where the problem is.
PROF. SCHARF: Bill says that is the biggest issue. Probably the biggest
issue in the minds of most people was not the judges changing
the guard but the assassination of the defense counsel. So the
second issue is: what should the IHT do to better ensure the
safety of trial participants, especially defense attorneys?
Before I open up [the question for the panel], a word
of background.... Two defense counsel died during the very
first week of the trial when they were assassinated. Before that
happened, both of those defense counsel and all the defense
counsel were approached by both the United States govern-
ment and the Iraqi government and asked if they could pro-
vide them security. And also it was suggested that they do not
show their faces on television. Now, the defense counsel
wanted to show their faces on television, talked to the media,
and they did not trust the U.S. government or the Iraqi gov-
ernment for security, so they turned it down. I think the U.S.
government and the Iraqi government's response was, meta-
phorically, well, that is your funeral. It turned out it was.
After the two of them were assassinated, Judge Amin
brought all the defense counsel in, and he said, "Look, we
have to solve this problem. We cannot have defense counsel
dying any more." They worked out a compromise, and under
the compromise, money was given to the defense counsel to
hire their own personal guards, personally selected, who were
given the authority to carry weapons and protect them, like
rock stars or football stars would have. That seemed to work
pretty well. Nobody else died for the eight months of the trial
until a week before the closing arguments when a third de-
fense counsel was assassinated. Strangely, there were no secu-
rity guards there at the time defense counsel was assassinated.
I have heard twenty different stories about why that is so. The
one I tend to believe is that he pocketed the money and did not
hire security, but I am not sure exactly if that is the case ei-
ther. It has just not been answered definitively in the press or
anywhere. But clearly, there is a problem. You cannot have
2006-2007]
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trials when you have three of the twelve defense counsel be-
ing assassinated during the trials. Everybody agrees with that.
So the question is what should the IHT do in the future
to better protect the defense counsel? Anybody? Mark?
PROF. DRUMBL: I think what I would like to do is take your question
and unpack a broader point. We all place considerable trans-
formative value in the Iraqi High Tribunal trials. We have
placed so much hope, ambition, aspiration, and meaning in
this set of prosecutions. Some are calling it the trial of the cen-
tury. And I guess this is understandable because most of us in
the room are lawyers or soon to be lawyers. However, one of
the shortcomings to our faith is that it has led to a rush to trial
in a context where there are security problems. Iraq is not sta-
ble. I do not think IHT convictions will promote stability.
Much more is required. We are really very grandiose about
this trial. We have taken this ambitious approach. We have in-
ternalized it. We have had a rush to trial. We are going to keep
on trying. We are going to keep on moving forward, but I
think at the end of the day, we need to be sensitive about and
accept the facts that trials for international crimes ... can only
do so much. Had we had more modest understandings of the
socially transformative role of war crimes trials at the begin-
ning, perhaps we would not be faced with issues of how to
prosecute during a situation of insurrection.
So I just want to throw that out. We have all this talk
about [whether] this trial is on the side of due process or not-
I wonder whether we might want to have a conversation, in-
stead, on the relationship between the IHT and peace, justice,
and political transition in Iraq. Just because the trial does or
does not comport with often-technical questions of liberal le-
galism is no guarantor of the effectiveness of the judicial out-
put.
Ms. HODGKINSON: I am not sure there is much more you could do in
the current environment. Counsel were brought in. They were
asked what is it that could be possible solutions? They were
provided a bunch of solutions, including housing in the Green
Zone. I have been there. I walked through it. They choose not
to live there. It is challenging. They come in the country and
[Vol. 39:351
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meet with their clients, but they say they cannot come into
court. So as far as what you could do short of stopping the
trial or short of moving it outside the country, in this situation,
they have got in Iraq the IHT, which has done the best that
you could ask for, including the appointment of IHT standby
defense counsel to ensure a full and fair defense for when the
defense counsel choose not to come.
PROF. SCHARF: Should they have considered moving the trial outside
of Iraq?
Ms. HODGKINSON: I would say no, because again the decision was
made by the Iraqis to have a trial in Iraq. International law fa-
vors that if there is a competent court and if they are willing
and able to do it, then they try to do it there. Obviously, there
have been significant security issues that have risen up. It has
posed a challenge. They have tried to modify the procedures,
give more time to defense to put these measures in place. I
think they have taken the appropriate and reasonable steps in
line with moving forward on trials that they are expecting to
move forward on.
PROF. SCHARF: How different is the security situation and the chal-
lenges [facing the IHT from] trials of major terrorists in
Europe or Latin America or elsewhere of major narcotics
dealers in Latin America, of major mafioso in Italy or in New
York City? [During these trials] witnesses disappear or die,
defense counsel [and] prosecutors are executed, judges are
bribed, and yet, they seem to soldier-on most of the time. Is
this really a huge difference in Iraq?
PROF. BASSIOUNI: A few of us here-Sandy [Hodgkinson], Christo-
pher [Reid], Mike [Scharf]-have been in Iraq. I continue to
go there. And frankly, the situation outside the Green Zone is
really quite dangerous, particularly for somebody who is go-
ing to be identified as a foreigner. This is not only a question
of a conflict with different ethical religious groups. You have
a common criminal element that is working the streets. I
mean, Saddam released an extraordinarily large number of
people-estimated at about eighty thousand people-three
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weeks before the invasion. We do not know how many of
these were hard core criminals. There could be twenty or
.thirty thousand. Unfortunately, the core coalition forces did
not have time to deal with them as a common criminal ele-
ment. They have had time to consolidate. They have all of the
characteristics of organized crime units.
Now, if you had a tribunal, ideally outside the Green
Zone somewhere, the problem is that in a tribunal like that
you just do not have a few limited people who are coming in
and out on a daily basis. You have got a very large number of
people, whether it is people providing food or supplies or pa-
per or whatever. It is in addition to the defense counsel, the
judges, the prosecutors, the investigative judges, the support
personnel. It is very difficult to be able to ensure protection
even though you may want to create a sort of an island or for-
tress, like the Green Zone somewhere else. It would seem to
me it would be almost impossible because you are dealing
with so many different sources of danger that you cannot
identify. I mean, if you are dealing with the mafia or la cosa
nostra, you know who they are, where they are coming from.
Here you have got too many people out here. You do not
know where they are coming from.
PROF. CRANE: Security is security. It is all about security, whether it
be in America, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, or Rwanda. It is secu-
rity, security, and security. I think security is going to con-
sume this tribunal. It will come to the point where because of
political events that are totally out of their control, it may to-
tally absorb the hard work that is being done. And that is un-
fortunate, because ... instead of soberly thinking about law
and fact, people are looking over their shoulders, wondering
whether [they are] going to live until the end of the day. That
is not the point now, but certainly, security is going to be a
huge problem.
MR. ELLIS: But will it taint the final conclusion on whether the trial
met international standards?
The sense is that have probably lowered the bar now. If the
conclusion is yes, we got through this trial process and al-
though it was not perfect, we have a verdict and by the way,
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three defense attorneys were murdered, then I have a difficult
time understanding that a defendant has had a fair trial when
in that trial you have lost three defense attorneys. I do not
know if we have faced this issue yet in the international con-
text, but it will be interesting to see how history judges this,
and it will certainly be a different bar for future trials, good or
bad.
PROF. ScHARF: And as a follow up, I want to ask Bill Schabas this
question: if this were a case within the jurisdiction of the
ICC-for example, if Iraq had been a party to the ICC, as the
ambassador had said, he supported-and Iraq decided to
prosecute itself under these circumstances, would this be a
case that the ICC would likely find the country was actually
unable to prosecute under these circumstances?
PROF. SCHABAS: I think probably. I think that the ICC would not in-
tervene in such a case. I think we have had this discussion.
Many people have said, you know, we are not talking about a
sham trial. And we are also talking about a trial where inci-
dentally, in all likelihood, there is going to be a conviction and
the man is going to remain in jail for the rest of his life. So it
is not something where you are saying there is an impunity
problem exactly. So I think it is unlikely you would see any
intervention by the ICC. You know, this is not the worst trial
in history. I mentioned Pol Pot and leng Sary, and that was
really ugly business that they had. There were trials of the
Gang of Four in China. I am sure they were not models of
great justice. You know, it is not the Eichmann trial either.
That is not the point. This is not one of the great trials of his-
tory. It is somewhere in between. It is deeply flawed, but I do
not think we have to dismiss it as being a sham and travesty of
justice, but I would not put it on a pedestal either.
MR. REID: Somebody mentioned the word negligence. The death of
the defense counsel have really hit everybody working on this
case very hard, and we all took it very personally, and I can
tell you the first five or six times [defense counsel] refused
what they were being offered in terms of security, we did not
say, "well, that is your funeral." I sat in a room with transla-
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tors and with other prominent Iraqis who I thought could help
convince them, and we called every single one of them per-
sonally and begged them to accept the security measures that
we were offering. The U.S. Marshal Service is protecting a
judge or someone else. It is take it or leave it. You do it their
way, or you are not getting the protection. If you do not like
the fact they are going to bring a dog in to search the room
you are going into, that is tough. You accept their protection
or not.
In Iraq, we were very flexible. We were bending over
backwards, and even the Iraqi Minister of Interior was bend-
ing over backwards because he knew how difficult it would be
if one of the defense counsel were killed. So the question is,
what do you do in this case? You cannot say we are not going
to have a trial because it is too dangerous and moving out of
the country does not solve the problem because an Iraqi de-
fense counsel living in Iraq, whose family is Iraq, is going to
go back to Iraq. And you are going to have the same problem
whether they are going to comply with the security arrange-
ments or not. So this issue, unlike some others, really does not
go to the issue of should it be in Iraq or shouldn't it? ... You
cannot kidnap the defense counsel. You cannot make them
accept security.
MR. ELLIS: Where does it stop? You are saying you can still have a
trial even with the security issues. We have lost three defense
attorneys. [What if] we lose a fourth? Does it stop there? [If
we] lose five. Does it stop there? What is the standard?
Somebody has to question the legitimacy of the entire
trial process because of something as fundamental as losing
three defense attorneys. We are trying to get a sense of the ap-
propriate measurement? Where do we go?
MR. REID: We are dealing with [more than a] philosophical issue, but
a real world issue. What do you do? What do you do in order
to have a fair trial because you have to have a fair trial, be-
cause you cannot kidnap people.
PROF. SCHARF: When the ambassador [Samir Sumaida'ie] came [to
Case Western Reserve University School of Law], I was
[Vol. 39:351
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asked if he was coming with his own security. And I said,
"No, he did not think there would be any security threat in the
heartland of the Midwest." He was coming by himself. And
other people said that it is diplomatic security. The State De-
partment will be following him around, and that got me to
thinking. What about the idea of passive security? If the de-
fendants do not want security, or if they are pocketing the
money that they are supposed to be spending on security,
could you give them security that just kind of follows them
from a distance but is there in case there is the kind of attack
that occurred two weeks before the final judgment? Would
that work? What are the problems with that?
PROF. CRANE: It is just a practical point. The farther away you get
from the principal, the chances go up exponentially. It is al-
most a waste of time in some ways. It is tough anyway, but it
becomes tougher to protect if that becomes more of a back-
ground security.
PROF. SCHABAS: Yeah. I think we are getting off the track. First of all,
we are not experts on security. We are lawyers, you know.
And I do not want your advice. If my life is in danger, frankly,
with all due respect, I do not need your advice. I am going to
get a professional to advise me because I do not know what to
do, but I also suspect, the three that were killed, they were col-
leagues, they were fellow lawyers. And I would assume, I
would give them the benefit of the doubt that they were using
their best judgment on how to protect themselves; that they
were not doing crazy things. I do not think it is good to be
speculating about them pocketing the money and saying we
offered them protection. Okay. So we offered them three U.S.
Marines with submachine guns. I am not sure that is a way to
protect my life walking around like that. I assume they used
their own best judgment to do what was best to save their
lives, and they got killed anyway, and that is terrible. But I do
not know how to avoid that except maybe just sequester a
trial, the whole thing from beginning to end.
Ms. HODGKINSON: That was the point of spending all the money on
building and actual housing within the Green Zone right next
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to the court by a law library where they could do everything,
[including] meet with their clients. That was the purpose-to
sequester it in a safe place. But I think-and this may not sat-
isfy a lot of people because it is a generalized security issue-
but it is sad but true that in Iraq, IHT judges are not the only
judges who have been killed. And so the question is whether
they are being targeted because they are related to this tribu-
nal, whether they are being targeted because they are judges..
• . And the same defense counsel or whether it is simply that
some of them were unfortunately victim to random violence,
while we will never know for sure...
MR. BHUTA: I really do think it is outrageous to suggest that he put
that money into his pocket. He had four children at home. He
was staying in Bagdad until the end of the year to try and get
them out of the country after that .... I think that is an insult to
him and that is an insult to his family.
PROF. SCHARF: Okay. I was just saying that we do not know the rea-
son, and that is one of the things that has been speculated
about in the press.
MR. BHUTA: Talk to the defense lawyers, and you might get some
perspective on it.
PROF. SCHARF: Okay. Well, thank you.
PROF. DRUMBL: It is valuable to ask ourselves whether this trial con-
forms to due process? But for me another important question
is, what is the relationship between this trial and peace and
stability in Iraq as a whole? And that is not a question that we
have really asked ourselves today, and I think it is a very im-
portant one. I agree with Bill. We are not security experts...
this is a broad question that addresses sequencing. When is the
right time to have trials? And, if trials create stability, that is
good. But what if in the Iraqi context ... there is an inverse
relationship? Then I would be very worried about holding that
trial right now in whatever zone you might want to have it in
Baghdad.
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PROF. BASSIOUNI: First, let me lay a foundation to answer your ques-
tion, and I do not mean to be self-serving, but for three years I
have been working in Iraq. We have had six conferences with
law professors and judges and maybe involving a total of
about six hundred people. I have had all the judges in Siracusa
for ten days, and we have done a lot of work presently. I have
sixty-six people working in Iraq doing an oral history. We
have interviewed 2,700 victims so far, and I can tell you there
probably is not an Iraqi, at least that I can imagine, that would
not want justice in a broader sense, that would not want the
truth to be known, that would not want all of these people in
the Ba'ath regime and not only those major defendants strung
by their toes.
So there is no doubt that this is very much in need.
Every one of the different constituencies, particularly the
Kurds and the Shiites want the story of their victimization to
come out. They want to show how bad the regime was. And
frankly, I think the majority of people that I have dealt with
are disappointed with the trials. They do not think it is bring-
ing out the truth. They do not think it is showing these people
the way they really were. They do not think the proceedings in
any way resemble what they imagined or anticipated. They
really see Saddam as running away with the show....
So the wrenching problem is really what Ken Roth
said. We should have been speaking about all of these terrible
crimes. We should have been conveying to the people the
sense of justice, and unfortunately, we wind up quibbling
about [whether] that is proper law and [if the procedure]
worked out right. And that is the unfortunate part of it, and
maybe more unfortunate, had we given it more thought before
we set it all up and had we tried to play all these contingencies
and tried to mitigate the damage, we would not have been in
that position, and we are now trying to mitigate the damages
that are proceeding. But there is no doubt the people really
want justice in any way, and they want to have a record of
these terrible violations that took place, and for them to think
that all of this is now sort of bound in a quagmire about pro-
cedures and processes and antics and the tribunal is adding
almost insult to injury I think.
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PROF. SCHARF: Let me ask a follow-up that Nehal's comment got me
to thinking about. Would it make sense to have an interna-
tional investigation into the assassination of these defense
counsel, like the international investigation that is ongoing
with respect to the assassination of a former Lebanese prime
minister, Hariri?
PROF. CRANE: How would they do that? I mean, it is an interesting
idea, but how would they do it, even if the U.S. or the coali-
tion forces gave them full protection? It would almost be im-
possible. How would you do that? I am just throwing that out.
PROF. ScHARF: What is the alternative? Just to turn your back on it
and not investigate it? Or allow the people to investigate it
that are accused of committing...
PROF. CRANE: We have to live in the real world. I do not think you
can do any investigation.
PROF. ScHARF: Ever?
PROF. CRANE: Well, I am not so sure. When the dust settles, maybe
some day, but right now I do not think you can do it effec-
tively.
Ms. HODGKINSON: There have been investigations into it. The ques-
tion is whether or not you think the brokers are credible,
whether they are the Iraqi government or the Americans look-
ing into it on their behalf at their request. But the independent
investigations have not moved at such a tremendous pace in
the past that I would have reason to believe that they could be
achieved in a time to really impact what is happening in the
trial.... It has been looked into by the Iraqis, by the Ameri-
cans, and again, there has not yet been any reason to be able to
definitively link that they were targeted specifically because
of their role in the trial.
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PROF. ScHARF: Let me change tacks and ask a brand new line of
questioning, which I am sure is going to get everybody else
going. Was it a mistake to begin with the Dujail rather than
Anfal trial or another case, especially in light of the fact that
there is the possibility of the death penalty?
PROF. BASSIOUNI: I was among those recommending it to the judges,
and I thought that this was the ideal case to start with because
it was a case that did not have any political dimensions to it.
This was not a situation where the defense could raise the ar-
gument of you received intelligence information from the U.S.
or you received the precursors from the UK or Germany or the
Netherlands. This was a fairly straight-forward murder case,
and so there were no political ramifications to it. I think it was
really the ideal case to proceed on because it was on very nar-
row technical grounds, and all of the documentary evidence
was really there from the record of the revolutionary court that
went through the decisions and Saddam's approval of the
death sentence.
PROF. SCHABAS: You got to the heart of one of the problems with the
death penalty there. If he is executed probably in the next six
to eight months, you are going to deprive the people of Iraq a
justice for all of the other crimes, and there is a suggestion
that he is [akin to] the private property of the people of Iraq.
But there are other victims as well. Iran would love to have a
little crack at him at some point. In fact, they have asked for
him, and they are going to be deprived as well. So he should
be tried for the crimes he committed against the people of Iran
and the people of Kuwait and all of that. If this hasty trial on a
very focused narrow indictment is followed by the death pen-
alty, it will give a few people satisfaction. We say now it is a
fundamental human right to know the truth and have justice,
and there are going to be a lot of people deprived of that.
PROF. BASSIOUNI: But that is easy to solve. You amend the statute,
and you do not execute the person thirty days after the date of
entry of judgment, or you withhold the entry of judgment until
all of the trials have taken place, you know, and you enter it
three years from now. So one does not exclude a remedy here.
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PROF. SCHARF: Mark?
MR. ELLIS: Well, I think to clarify for the audience, the issue here is
that under the statute, if the trial chamber were to convict
Saddam Hussein and then sentence him to death, that case
would automatically go to the appeals court. But after the final
decision of the appeals court, assuming they uphold the ver-
dict, then the sentence has to be imposed within thirty days,
and that is the conflict within the statute. Having said that, I
think that administratively, logistically the court will figure
out how they can come up with a Dujail verdict and at the
same time move forward with the Anfal case and any other fu-
ture cases. I think they are wrestling with this issue right now,
which is why I believe the Dujail case was the appropriate
first case. The case was manageable and certainly not as com-
plex as what we are seeing now in the Anfal case. And I had
great hope that once the Dujail case was over and the court
moved to the Anfal case, which was the more complex case,
the court would have resolved all these issues.
Of course, the lingering problem is, as I said earlier,
government interference, which existed in the Dujail, and ex-
ists now in the Anfal case.
PROF. SCHARF: Mark?
PROF. DRUMBL: Regardless of one's concerns regarding sequencing or
the effects of trials, I do agree that in this case the people want
to see justice done. Probably the most valuable aspect of this
trial is truth-telling and legitimizing the historical records.
One concern that I have, even if a death sentence were sus-
pended with regard to a verdict in the Dujail case is what
value any subsequent trials would convey if they were trials of
a man who already had been convicted and sentenced to
death. One of the reasons why the prosecutors' focus in Iraq is
on serial mini trials is to avoid the blockbuster, all-
encompassing, very long trial that came out of the Milosevic
proceedings, which we all know ended in a very unsatisfying
way. Charging Milosevic with so many counts allowed him to
effectively delay the proceedings and, hence, cheat justice.
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But I think there are dangers with mini trials, too.
Does the sum of the mini trial parts add up to an overall narra-
tive of Saddam's and the Ba'ath regime's criminal conduct? I
think it can work in that regard, but I think it is something to
which folks associated with the tribunal need to be sensitive.
This is especially important insofar as the trials that follow the
Dujail proceedings are higher impact. For example, the Anfal
proceedings will involve genocide charges and the use of
chemical weapons on the Kurdish population, with at least
fifty thousand deaths.
PROF. SCHARF: I am going to go to Marieke, and then Sandy, and then
David.
MS. WIERDA: Of course, originally Saddam was not part of this trial,
and he was added at the very last minute. Could you reflect on
whether that was really such a good idea? I think we have
been talking also a lot about the fair trial rights of the senior
defendants in this trial, but what do you think it did to the fair
trial rights of the more junior defendants? And also, in terms
of using this trial to start out, I know a lot of us started early
on to analyze the evidence, but there is not a very clear narra-
tive perhaps that emerged through the evidence from this trial
... there were just facts that were confusing, an assassination
attempt, and all these kinds of things.
So in light of that convoluted history and then perhaps
the prosecution case, which may not have been as strong as it
should be, where do we think we stand on whether it really
was such a good idea?
PROF. SCHARF: Before we go to your two issues, does anybody want
to answer that directly?
Ms. HODGKINSON: I was just going to add two quick footnotes to
what everybody else said because I think Dujail was the right
trial to start with to try to work out the kinks. It was not neces-
sarily envisioned that Saddam would be a defendant naturally
in that. He might have been. He might not have been. But that
is what came out of the investigative process through the Iraqi
system. The fact that he was part of it obviously brought up
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the specter of how much the public was scrutinizing outbursts
and other parts....
The second one as to whether or not if he is, in fact,
executed based upon this first case, which I suspect we will all
see the Iraqis trying to find a way to work this out somehow in
their system correctly. What is important to remember is there
are a lot of other defendants who are responsible for the other
major atrocities that they want justice for. Chemical Ali, for
example, for the Anfal [trial], and there are other defendants.
So despite the fact that other trials may go forward long after
[Saddam] has had his sentence carried out, whenever that may
be, there are other people that are still to be held accountable.
PROF. BASSIOUNI: To answer Marieke's question... If you under-
stood the evolution of the very repressive Ba'ath regime over
a period of thirty years and how that repressive regime
worked, in so many sometimes devious ways, and ways that
you may never imagine. We have an attorney [here today
who] said I am an immigration lawyer. I have represented a
woman who was raped by the driver of Uday. You know, we
do have situations that do not rise to the level of a genocide,
but we have a regime, which on a daily basis violated every
possible rule that the Iraqi law and society have. And this one
was a case in which, you know, Saddam was elevated to a
demagogue. The demagogue was about to be shot, and every-
body in the system of security was running like crazy to get
there before the other in order to show that they were the good
guys who caught the bad guys that wanted to assassinate. If
they would have had to kill thousands of people in order to be
able to say, "See, Mr. President, we got the people who
wanted to kill you," they would have done so. And so it was
in a sense a very good case to show how all of these under-
lings did it for him, but ultimately, he approved, he encour-
aged, he supported, and he had command responsibility.
MR. ELLIS: I think the question is such a great one because it points to
another issue in the Dujail case of having eight defendants-
four senior defendants and four lower defendants-and I
question whether the evidence has proven that the four lower
defendants are guilty of crimes against humanity. My sense is
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that the court has not proven that the charges against the four
lower defendants because of the intent and knowledge re-
quirements for crimes against humanity. And in the end, that
may work to the advantage of the court if the court finds the
four senior defendants guilty but the four lower defendants not
guilty of crimes against humanity. It is not that they have not
committed criminal acts, but it is an interesting as to why the
court has brought charges of crimes against humanity against
these four lower defendants. I really question whether they
should have ever been in the court on these charges.
PROF. SCHARF: And Mike Newton suggested in the margins that a
really good development might [take place] on October 16
when the tribunal reconvenes, and it is assessing the evidence
but not [rendering] its verdict. It could actually decide to dis-
miss two, three, four of those cases, and that would be consis-
tent with what it says it is going to do, and it might be a really
nice signal to the tribunal.
MR. ELLIS: That is what I am saying. But the real question, Michael,
is what was the basis for including those four defendants to
begin with? In my opinion, the evidence was lacking for the
charges of crimes against humanity. My question is why were
they there to begin with?
PROF. SCHARF: We actually have a debate on our website on this. Our
students at Case School of Law completed a sixty-page re-
search memo on the question of whether, if somebody turned
over a friend or neighbor, knowing that the regime was going
to torture and kill them, would that be sufficient to be a crime
against humanity if it was done in the course of widespread
similar occasions? And apparently, the allegations-I do not
know if they were proven, because it really seemed like the
evidence focused on Barzan, Saddam, and Al Bandar, but the
allegations were that at least two of these individuals had been
for political reasons turning in their neighbors who disap-
peared forever.
PROF. BASSIOUNI: See, that problem would have been resolved had
we added to the statute and other violations of the 1969 crimi-
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nal code, and we could have gotten these people for murder
and rape and torture. It would have been much easier if that
would have been the case.
PROF. ScHARF: When David Crane prosecuted, his tribunal had a
clause that none of the other tribunals have, which was a lim-
iting clause that said his tribunal was only allowed to focus on
those who bear the greatest responsibility. It is analogous, I
suppose, to the higher-ups. And there have been debates that
if you only focus on the higher-ups, it sends the wrong signal
to the [underlings]-that you cannot succeed as a Saddam
Hussein or as a dictator unless you have a psychopathic fol-
lowing, and, therefore, you have to have exemplary trials at
other levels. So I am wondering what the panel's take is on
the fact that they even indicted some of these [underlings].
Was that a mistake?
PROF. CRANE: Certainly you have raised a very important question,
and that is, what is the standard now that we need to move
forward into the twenty-first century, creating mandates for
future trials, whatever they may be? It is my considered opin-
ion that the greatest responsibility should be the standard be-
cause we cannot prosecute everyone. We have to go to those
who created the conditions about which these situations are
developed.
Greatest responsibility proved to be an effective tool in
Sierra Leone and West Africa. It allowed the prosecutor to fo-
cus very quickly and get started. I am very well aware of the
impunity gap, but the difference between prosecuting twenty
people or so and thirty thousand is significant and would liter-
ally throw the baby out with the bath water in my opinion.
And the greatest responsibility were the political com-
promises, as we all know, when they were drafting the statute
for the Special Court for Sierra Leone. If it would not have
been the greatest responsibility, there would not have been a
special court. It is as simple as that.
PROF. SCHABAS: Well, the judges at the international criminal court
are, in effect, importing similar to the one from Sierra Leone
through the use of the word gravity in Article 17, Paragraph 1
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of the statute. And the prosecutor has also made some interest-
ing determinations along those lines. He, for example, is say-
ing he will not prosecute certain cases where there aren't large
numbers of victims. So in other words, he makes his choice
based on just a numeric, just a calculation on the quality of
victims, which sends an interesting message as well with re-
spect to the investigation concerning British war crimes in
Iraq. He said, yes, British soldiers have committed war crimes
in Iraq but not very many. And I guess the legal advisor in
Britain now has probably written an opinion to the general
saying, "Keep the numbers down, boys. It is okay. You can
commit war crimes but not too many, you know. That is off
limits."
PROF. CRANE: It is really important to understand, prosecuting thir-
teen, twenty individuals is going to take around five or six
years to do it fairly, openly and appropriately, because it is an
international tribunal and under international criminal law and
the statutes. If you change that to most responsible in the West
African situation, it went from twenty-ish to one hundred to
three hundred. I am looking at in my estimation fifteen to
twenty years of prosecution. So in my opinion, just as a way
of thinking is that, you know, any tribunal that is in existence
over five years begins to unravel around the edges and be-
comes more of a political liability than a stability.
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